to quantify detection performance and minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to blind the network (ctblind) as a security metric. We show that both KLD and ctblind increase when SR noise is added at the honest sensors. When SR noise is added to the fusion center, we analytically show that there is no gain in terms of ctblind or the network-wide performance measured in terms of the deflection coefficient. We also model a game between the network and the Byzantines and present a necessary condition for a strategy (SR noise) to be a saddle-point equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stochastic Resonance (SR) [1] is a counter-intuitive physical phenomenon where the output signals of some nonlinear systems can be amplified by adding noise to the input (see [2] and references therein). Chen et aI. , in [3] , have shown that, for sub-optimal and non-linear systems, SR can be used to improve the detection performance under a constraint on the false alarm rate. In this paper, we address the mitigation On the other hand, the adaptive learning scheme proposed by Ve mpaty et al. in [6] is another mitigation scheme that works for any fraction of Byzantines in the network.
In [7] , the use of Stochastic Resonance (SR) to counter the Byzantine attacks in the distributed inference framework has been proposed where we considered the rather simplistic case of independent Byzantine attacks (IMBA). Also, in many other frameworks such as SR at FC and game-theoretic framework considered in [7] , only numerical results were presented. In this paper, we consider the more complex case of cooperative Byzantine attacks (CMBA). We also analytically explore the case when SR is added to the Fe's receptions from the local sensors. Also, in the game between the honest and the Byzantine nodes, we present a necessary condition that a strategy profile should satisfy, in order to be a saddle point equilibrium and a supporting example that illustrates our analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model and the performance metrics used in our analysis. For completeness, we summarize our previous results on IMBA [7] in Section III. In Section IV, we present our results of noise-enhanced distributed inference in the presence of cooperative Byzantine attacks. In Section V, we present a game-theoretic formulation of the noise enhanced distributed inference problem in the presence of Byzantines. We also analyze the performance of distributed inference problem when SR is added at the FC in Section VI. Finally, we conclude the work in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
of Byzantine attacks in the context of distributed inference A. System Model networks by suitably adding SR noise.
We follow the same model as the one used in our earlier Byzantine attacks [4] [5] are those attacks in which some work [7] . We consider a distributed detection network con of the sensors within the network intentionally send false sisting of N sensors which perform local binary hypotheses information to the Fusion Center (FC) in order to disrupt testing involving hypotheses Ho and HI and send their local the inference process. Authors in [4] and [5] addressed this decisions Ui E {O, I} to the Fe. We assume the presence threat in a distributed detection framework for an inference of M = aN Byzantines in the network which send false network and presented the optimal attacking distribution for information to the FC in order to deteriorate the performance the Byzantines under the error exponent framework. They of the inference network.
found the minimum fraction of Byzantines (ablind) needed We denote the i.i.d. observations made at the i th sensor as to make the two hypotheses indistinguishable to the FC Xi, and the distribution of Xi conditioned on the hypothesis under different assumptions. From the network's perspective, Hk as p(XiIHk), k = 0,1. In particular, we consider the signal several mitigation schemes have been suggested to counter model Xi = e + ni, where e = 0 under Ho, e = A under HI these attacks. Rawat et aI. , in [5] , proposed identify-and-and ni rv P nC) for simplicity.
eliminate strategies for the FC to counter these attacks when Due to the presence of a suboptimal quantizer at the local the percentage of Byzantines in the network is less than 50%. sensors, SR noise Wi is added to the observations in order ISSN:1882-5621/13/ ©2013 NICT to improve the detection perfonnance. Hence, the resulting observation at the i th sensor is given by
We restrict our discussion to a hard quantizer at the local sensors and, therefore, if the suboptimal quantization function is given by 'lTC)' the operating point in the ROC is given by (PTa, PJ) for a sensor of type T (T = H (honest) or B (Byzantine». When sign detector is used as the suboptimal quantizer at the local decision-making stage, the operating point of a local sensor of type T can be expressed as a function of Pn ( . ) and p� ( . ) where p� ( . ) is the pdf of the SR noise Wi added at the i th sensor ( [7] ). If a is the probability with which a sensor is Byzantine, then the effective operating point of any given sensor, as observed by the FC, is given by
The above expression is derived under the assumption that the Byzantinesftip their local decisions with probability '1' as it has been shown to be the optimal strategy for the Byzantines in a distributed detection framework [5] . We assume that the FC has knowledge about the fraction of Byzantines, a = � in the network, but cannot differentiate between the honest and Byzantine sensors (same as [5] ). The FC makes the global decision Uo E {O, I} by fusing the local decisions ({ UI, ... , UN}) transmitted by the local sensors.
B. Performance metrics
In this paper, we consider Kullback-Leibler Divergence (DKL) as the detection performance metric and ablind as the security performance metric, which are described as follows.
Kullback-Leibler Divergence: D K L has often been used as a performance metric for distributed detection systems. It is a measure of the distance between two probability distributions, P(uiIHo ) and P(uiIHd. As pointed out by Rawat et al. in [5] , the Byzantines would try to maximize the damage they can cause to the inference process by reducing D K L which results in more decision errors.
Blinding fraction of Byzantines: ablind is the minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to degrade the performance of the network to the maximum possible extent so that the network is totally blind of the local sensors' data (DKL = 0).
Similar to Rawat et at. , in [5] , this serves as a security metric.
This can be expressed as follows.
where the expressions pI = J� Pn(t) * p�(t)dt and PTa = Jo oo Pn (t) * p� (t )dt have been used.
C. Malicious Byzantine Attacks
There are broadly two possible kinds of attacks by the Byzantines: Independent Malicious Byzantine Attacks (IMBA) and Cooperative Malicious Byzantine Attacks (CMBA) which are described as follows [5] :
Independent Malicious Byzantine Attacks (IMBA): In this case, each Byzantine attacks the network independently relying on its own observation and decision. In this case, pf = pf and pia = PYa. Hence, using (4) the resulting ablind = �, i.e., unless the number of Byzantines is greater than or equal to 50% of the total number of cooperating sensors, the FC can not be made blind under IMBA.
Cooperative Malicious Byzantine Attacks (CMBA): In this attacking scenario, Byzantines collaborate to make the decision and use this information for the attack. This type of attack is more practical in the situation where some intruder controls the Byzantine sensors. For a given pf and PYa, Byzantine sensors can increase (pf -Pia) with cooperation and so the resulting ablind comes out to be less than .!. Assuming that all the M Byzantines collude, let QIf and Q¥a be their collective probability of detection and probability of false-alarm respectively. QIf and Q r a can be written as:
Here, the L out of M fusion rule has been used for collaboration among the Byzantine sensors, i. e., when L or more Byzantines decide on HI , the collective decision of the Byzantines is Hl . To maximize the damage to the network, the Byzantines send the same (wrong) decision to the FC based on the collective decision. [7] In this section, we summarize our results on noise-enhanced distributed inference in the presence of IMBA in [7] . We employed SR locally at the sensors and analyzed the gain in detection performance. We analyzed two particular scenarios: SR employed at the honest sensors and the SR employed at both honest and Byzantines.
III. NOISE-ENHANCED DISTRIBUTED INFERENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF INDEPENDENT BYZANTINE ATTACKS

A. SR at Honest Nodes
When only the honest sensors employ SR, we have shown that the optimum SR noise at the honest sensors is I-peak noise (Lemma I in [7] ) . We restate this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (See [7] ) . To maximize (Xblind, the optimum SR noise at the honest nodes can be expressed as p ;t, opt (t) = 5(t -t o ) i. e. i-peak SR is optimum for obtaining the maximum (Xblind.
Having found the optimal SR noise, we also demonstrated a two-fold improvement (both in terms of detection and security performances) in the sensor network with the use of SR noise at the honest sensors.
B. SR at both Honest and Byzantine Nodes
When both Byzantine and honest sensors apply SR noise to their true observations in order to improve their respective performances, we have shown that the optimal SR noise pdf from the Byzantine's perspective is also a one-peak pdf. Due to the cancelling effect of Byzantine's SR noise, we showed that, when both honest and Byzantine nodes employ optimal SR noise, (Xblind drops to 0.5, resulting in no improvement of the security performance. Of course, when there are more number of honest nodes in the network, there is an improvement in the detection performance.
IV. NOISE-ENHANCED DISTRIBUTED INFERENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF COOPERATIVE BYZANTINE ATTACKS
In this section, we extend our results to include the case of cooperative Byzantine attacks. It is important to observe here that the results of the optimal noise to be added at the local sensors are independent of the kind of Byzantine Attacks discussed in Section II-C. This is because, even in the case of Cooperative Malicious Byzantine Attacks (CMBA), the Byzantines can enhance their global performance (Q: -Qf a ) by improving their local performance (pI -Pia).
In this attack, the Byzantines collaborate with each other and make a decision using an L out of M fusion rule after which all the Byzantines flip this decision and send it to the FC. This attack is superior to IMBA as this increases the (pI -Pia) value as described in Section II-C. Again, the No-SR curve drops to 0 when there are 50% Byzantine sensors present in the network under IMBA attack. Under CMBA, however, the No-SR curve drops to 0 when there are 21% Byzantines in the network. As before, the Gaussian SR noise provides improvement compared to the no SR case in terms of both performance and security, (Xblind. The optimal 2-peak SR noise gives further improvement and the I-peak SR noise, which has been shown to be the optimal noise, maximizes the performance. Ta ble I shows the values of (Xblind for all the cases under both IMBA and CMBA.
We have compared the simulation results with our analytical expressions of (Xblind obtained using (4) 
V. GAME-THEORETIC MODEL FOR DISTRIBUTED INFERENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF BYZANTINES
In [7] , we formulated a zero-sum game between the Byzan tines and the inference network as a two-player zero-sum minimax game between the Byzantines and the network with the utility function as the KL divergence. The set of strategies for the Byzantines is defined by the p.d.f. of the SR noise, p� (t) employed at the Byzantines, while that of the honest sensors is defined by p;; (t).
Hence, the problem statement is given as follows. where DKL = DKL, whenever Pta :: From Section III-B, we know that the optimal distribution of the SR noises at the honest sensors and the Byzantines are one-peak noises. In other words, p;; (t) = 5(t -CH ) (8) Knowing the structure of the optimal distribution of SR noises at both the honest sensors and the Byzantines, in this paper, we analytically find the optimal choice of "one-peak" constants CH and CB as follows. The optimal choice of the SR noise constants CH and CB satisfies the following necessary condition.
Proof In finding the saddle point, we partially differen tiate DKL with respect to both CH and CB, and equate them to zero to find the set of stationary points, as follows.
Expanding each of the equations in (10), we have
Dividing (lla) and (l1b), we have
which is the same as given in (9) .
• Note that (9) does not depend on the value of cx. In other words, the optimal choice of the SR noise constants does not depend on the fraction of Byzantines within the network.
Example: Consider an example where ni rv p(x ) where p( x) is a Gaussian mixture noise with two peaks. Being a symmetric distribution, the necessary condition in (9) reduces to PO( CH) ·po(A +CB) = PO( CB) ·po(A +CH). It is easy to note that the set of stationary points CH = CB, satisfy the necessary condition. Also, note that when CH = -CB, then po(A -CH) = po(A + CH), which can be possible when A -CH and A + CH coincide with the two peaks. Therefore, CH = -CB = -J.L -A is also a stationary point. The second derivative test sieves the saddle points from the above set of stationary points.
VI. SR NOISE EMPLOYED AT THE FUSION CENTER
In this section, we theoretically analyze the case when SR noise is added to the received signals at the FC. We assume a Rayleigh fading model to account for the non-ideal transmissions between the local sensors and the FC. This model for sensor-to-FC channels has been analyzed in the past (See [8] - [ 10] ) . In [9] , an optimal likelihood ratio (LR)-based fusion scheme was derived assuming full knowledge of the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) and local sensor detection performance indices. In [10] , the likelihood ratio based on channel statistics (LRT-CS) was derived and shown to perform well as compared to the optimal LR based fusion rule. This fusion rule eliminates the need for instantaneous CSI, but still requires knowledge of the channel statistics as well as the performance indices of the local sensors. The fusion rule that requires the least information is the equal gain combiner (EGC) given below.
where ri is the signal received from the i th sensor after the SR noise is added, given as follows. where u�/ B E {O, I} is the i th sensor's local decision, hi is the amplitude of the Rayleigh Fading channel with E[hTJ = 1 and ni is the zero-mean AW GN with variance (J2 . cit c and c� c are the optimal I-peak SR noises added to the Honest and the Byzantine sensors' rsignlas received at the FC respectively. It has been shown that the EGC based fusion rule, although suboptimal, performs reasonably well for most practical SNR values [9] . We, therefore, consider the EGC based fusion rule in this work, and investigate if its performance can be enhanced using SR noise in the presence of Byzantines. We use the deflection coefficient
as a performance criterion due to its simplicity and its strong relationship with the actual overall detection performance [12] . for k = 0, 1. Here, Xo = Pja = PYa = pia and X l = Pd = p!/ = P/f under IMBA.
The deflection coefficient, defined in (15), is then given by
(J 5 4 (J 5 Note that the D(A) becomes 0 when ablind = 0. 5 and it is independent of the SR noise constants.
• As an illustration, we consider a simple example where one-peak SR noise is applied at the FC. We simulate the example scenario for about 100,000 Monte-Carlo runs and plot the deflection coefficient as given by (15) in Fig. 2 . We observe that SR noise, when added at the FC, neither gives an improvement in terms of security (ablind) nor in terms of detection performance (D(A» and, therefore, both the curves in Fig. 2 completely overlap. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extended our previous work in [7] and showed that the SR phenomenon provides robustness to the network even in the presence of collaborative Byzantine attacks. We also found that the p.d.f. of the optimal SR noise in the presence of Byzantine attackers is the same as that of the results given by Chen et al. , in [3] , when there are no Byzantines in the network. In the game-theoretic framework between the honest and the Byzantine nodes, we provided a necessary condition that a strategy profile should satisfy, thereby significantly reducing the search-space in the computation of the saddle-point equilibrium. Finally, we have analytically shown that there is no gain (in terms of both detection and security performance) by adding SR noise to the signals received at the FC.
